Fa’asaina Park, owner of the Karaoke bar in Satala who was found guilty by a jury of four men and two women in October in connection with a prostitution case wherein she was found guilty of of promoting prostitution, has made a motion for a judgment of acquittal and is seeking  for an order setting side the jury’s verdict on the charge of promoting prostitution in the second degree.

Park was found guilty, along with her employee Lusia Tusi aka Shiela, of promoting prostitution second degree, a class C felony punishable with up to seven years in jail, a fine up to $5,000 or both, and two counts of third degree assault, which are both class A misdemeanors carrying a jail term of up to one year and a fine of up to $1,000 for each count.

Prosecuting for the government was Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer Bargmann while representing Park is Fiti Sunia. Assistant Public Defender Joel Shiver represented Sheila.

According to Park’s motion filed through her attorney Sunia, court rules permit a defendant to move for judgment of acquittal if the jury returns a verdict of guilty and is discharged. On a motion for judgment of acquittal the court shall order entry of judgement of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the information if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offenses.

Sunia quoted case law between the USA vs Lucas that if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government no rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Sunia stated that the prosecution’s substantive evidence relied entirely on the testimony of Iuliana Malo and Mele Wilson (complaining witnesses).

The pertinent evidence is discussed below in connection with the defendant’s connections. Sunia’s motion further states that the statute specifically provides that there be two or more prostitutes involved in prostitution activity. The evidence was insufficient to establish this element beyond a reasonable doubt, he alleges.

PROSTITUTION ACTIVITY

Sunia argues that the first half of this element requires prostitution activity which is defined as sexual intercourse or sexual contact in exchange for value. “Mele testified that she saw sexual contact between Iuliana and her boyfriend in defendant’s bar, but there was absolutely no evidence that such sexual contact was in exchange for any value.”

“In fact, Mele who testified to the number of beers she drank, never connected that beer to any sexual contact of any kind, not between her and anyone else or between Iuliana and her boyfriend. Iuliana’s touching of her boyfriend therefore could not constitute prostitution activity.”

Sunia in his motion noted that there was also general testimony from Iuliana and Mele about two incidents where they said other employees engaged in a sexual type of touching with customers. “Not once, however was there any testimony that anything of value was paid for that touching.”

The motion states that while Iuliana testified about a supposed business strategy of flirting to induce spending, there no testimony that any spending was induced as a result. Sunia claims that the prosecution’s unsubstantiated statement about profit was unconnected to any prostitution activity of any kind.

Though circumstantial evidence could be considered it would have required conjecture and speculation to infer that beer and food purchases were the primary products sold as defendant’s business were made in exchange for sexual touching. Sunia goes on to say that the prosecution highlighted evidence of kissing and indecent exposure in the bar, yet neither of these acts meets the definition of sexual contact and that these acts therefore do not constitute prostitution activity.

Sunia also argued that Iuliana and Mele — though claiming they were seeing their male friends — were apparently prostituting themselves on their own time for their own benefit and on their own terms as their prostitution occurred outside of the defendant’s business premises, therefore could not be counted towards the statute’s required number of prostitutes.

Sunia also notes that there was no evidence that defendant’s business was prostitution and there was insufficient evidence therefore to conduct the defendant of managing, supervising or owing, either alone or in association with others a house of prostitution busyness or enterprise. In conclusion, Sunia claims that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy any definition of promoting prostitution as there was no evidence that the defendant caused or aided anyone to engage in prostitution.

“The evidence was contrary.  Iuliana and Mele voluntarily engaged in prostitution on their own, similarly there was no evidence that defendant procured or solicited customers for prostitution or provided premises for prostitution purposes.”

“There was no evidence that defendant was operating a prostitution business” there was also no evidence that defendant accepted or received any proceeds from prostitution nor was the  defendant engaged in any conduct designed to facilitate prostitution.”

The motion has since been taken under advisement by Chief Justice Michael Kruse.